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UNHINGING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE FROM THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CANON: THE SEARCH FOR A
PRINCIPLED DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
Anthony Michael Kreis∗
INTRODUCTION
When eighty-four-year-old Edie Windsor challenged the Defense of
Marriage Act’s constitutionality, she may not have predicted the case’s historic
importance. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),1 enacted in 1996,
amended the federal Dictionary Act to define “marriage” and “spouse” to
exclude same-sex marriages in over 1,000 statutes and regulations.2 As a
result, DOMA prohibited lawfully married same-sex couples from availing
themselves of federal benefits provided by a wide swath of programs and
policies covering Social Security, housing, taxation, copyright, and veterans’
affairs.3
In United States v. Windsor, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Defense of Marriage Act violated the equal protection guarantees incorporated
in the Fifth Amendment.4 Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy held
upon “careful consideration”5 that DOMA had the “avowed purpose and
practical effect” of imposing inequality on wedded same-sex couples.6 The
statute’s principal effect and principal purpose rendered the law

∗ Emory University School of Law, Visiting Scholar-in-Residence; University of Georgia, Ph.D
Candidate, School of Public and International Affairs; J.D., Washington & Lee University School of Law;
B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author wishes to thank Professors Mary Dudziak,
Martha Fineman, Timothy Holbrook, Michael Perry, and Sonja West for their comments on earlier drafts of
this Essay and the Emory University School of Law faculty for a robust faculty roundtable on the Windsor
decision that greatly improved the formulation of this piece.
1 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2012)) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
2 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
3 Id. at 2694.
4 Id. at 2695.
5 Id. at 2692 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
6 Id. at 2693.
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constitutionally deficient.7 Despite some debate that the Court might sidestep
the equal protection arguments in favor of a pure federalism rationale or punt
on standing grounds,8 Justice Kennedy couched Windsor’s holding in a hybrid
of substantive due process, equal protection, and federalism.9
The Court’s majority was careful, however, to reiterate that Windsor did
not immediately undermine state same-sex marriage prohibitions.10 Perhaps
seeing the limitations of that caveat and Windsor as ushering in new litigation
attacking the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans, Justice Samuel
Alito vigorously dissented. Writing for himself and joined in part by Justice
Clarence Thomas, Justice Alito argued, “Same-sex marriage presents a highly
emotional and important question of public policy—but not a difficult question
of constitutional law. The Constitution does not guarantee the right to enter
into a same-sex marriage. Indeed, no provision of the Constitution speaks to
the issue.”11
Justice Alito went on to forcefully contend that the Court erred in its
application of substantive due process to the liberty interest claimed by Edie
Windsor.12 Under the traditional formulation of the substantive due process
doctrine, substantive due process analyses are two tiered. For those
fundamental rights and liberties that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition,”13 “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental,”14 and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”15

7

Id. at 2694.
See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Might Justice Kennedy Spring a Surprise on DOMA?, L.A. TIMES, (June 22,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/22/opinion/la-oe-winkler-doma-supreme-court-20130623 (“[S]peculation
has recently turned to the possibility that Kennedy, instead of voting to strike DOMA, might decide the case
on narrow procedural grounds that leave the basic constitutionality of DOMA unresolved.”); Allison Trzop,
Evening Round-up: DOMA Argument, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 27, 2013, 6:57 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2013/03/evening-round-up-doma-argument/ (“Federalism also attracted attention, as Court watchers
parsed Justice Kennedy’s evident concern for marriage as a matter traditionally regulated by the states.”).
9 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96. Justice Scalia strenuously objected to the majority’s analysis.
“The sum of all the Court’s nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection
grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism component
playing a role) because it is motivated by a ‘bare . . . desire to harm’ couples in same-sex marriages.” Id. at
2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotations marks omitted).
10 Id. at 2696 (“This opinion and its holding are confined to those lawful marriages.”).
11 Id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 2714–15.
13 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
14 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
15 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
8
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the doctrine demands strict scrutiny.16 For all other liberty interest claims
under substantive due process guarantees, the doctrine provides only rational
basis review.17 The Windsor decision failed to clearly articulate a traditional
standard of review but suggested the scrutiny was more exacting than
traditional rational basis.18
Justice Alito’s dissent is an indictment of the murky hybrid analysis,
suggesting the Court improperly applied a more rigorous judicial review to
DOMA without the broader historical inquiry demanded by the substantive due
process doctrine. In his dissent, Justice Alito argues that same-sex marriage
falls outside the boundaries of what constitutes a fundamental right. At the
heart of Justice Alito’s argument is a contention that the analysis of a
purportedly fundamental right’s history and tradition should be constructed at a
granular level:
It is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. In this country, no State
permitted same-sex marriage until the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held in 2003 that limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples violated the State Constitution. Nor is the right to same-sex
marriage deeply rooted in the traditions of other nations. No country
allowed same-sex couples to marry until the Netherlands did so in
19
2000.

In a separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia also leveled a similar biting
criticism of the majority’s flirtation with substantive due process. Justice Scalia
echoed Justice Alito’s critique that the Windsor majority neglected the
requisite historical analysis for substantive due process:
The majority never utters the dread words “substantive due process,”
perhaps sensing the disrepute into which that doctrine has fallen, but
that is what those statements [tying the Fifth Amendment and
16 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“In the face of [a
fundamental] interest . . . a State may not rest on threshold rationality or a presumption of constitutionality, but
may prevail only on the ground of an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the realm of the
reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right asserted.”).
17 Id. at 767 n.9 (“[A right must] be fundamental before anything more than rational basis justification is
required . . . not every case will require the ‘complex balancing’ that heightened scrutiny entails.”).
18 Justice Scalia correctly observed that the Court’s standard of review does not neatly fit within
traditional understandings of rational basis review or strict scrutiny. “As nearly as I can tell, the Court agrees
with that; its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central propositions are taken from rational-basis
cases . . . . But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that deferential framework.”
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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individual dignity] mean. Yet the opinion does not argue that samesex marriage is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
20
tradition,” a claim that would of course be quite absurd.

However, both dissents improperly frame the historical question by
structuring the analysis from the narrowest possible level of abstraction.21 The
question cannot be whether a constitutional challenge from same-sex couples
asserting a right to marry creates a new fundamental right—a right to same-sex
marriage. Rather, the question is whether the government’s prohibition of
same-sex couples’ access to the fundamental right of the freedom to marry can
withstand heightened judicial scrutiny.
In framing same-sex couples’ constitutional challenges for the freedom to
marry as seeking a “very new right,”22 the dissenting justices imply that
preexisting same-sex marriages and same-sex couple households, many of
which raise children,23 necessarily and inherently function differently than
heterosexual marriages and heterosexual-headed households. With this
presupposition and the emphasis on novelty, the two dissents improperly view
states that have extended same-sex marriage rights as having created dual
institutions of marriage, rather than simply allowing same-sex couples to share
in the same rights, privileges, responsibilities, and status afforded by a singular
institution of marriage. The latter, more inclusive posture is more proper for
constitutional analysis and is consistent with the Court’s prior marriage-related
decisions.
Time and again, the Supreme Court has reinforced the bedrock principle
that marriage is a fundamental right.24 However, when it has significantly

20 Id. at 2706–07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 720–21).
21 Beyond the fundamental right to marry, fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause have
also been stated broadly. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (voiding private, consensual
anti-sodomy laws citing a right to choose relationships and “dignity”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (invalidating contraceptive prohibition for married couples under a
“right of martial privacy”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (overturning statute
proscribing private primary education as violating the parental liberty to raise children).
22 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2715 (Alito, J., dissenting).
23 See Sabrina Tavernise, Adoptions Rise by Same-Sex Couples, Despite Legal Barriers, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2011, at A11 (noting an upward trend in same-sex couples adopting children).
24 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (“This Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (articulating marriage as “one of the basic civil rights of man”);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (“Marriage . . . [is] the most important relation in life . . . .”).
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extended that right to expand the constitutional freedom to marry, the Court
has not relied upon the type of analysis advocated by Justices Scalia and Alito.
This Essay will highlight the improper formulation and application of the Due
Process Clause in the dissenting opinions in Windsor through the lens of the
Court’s decisions on prisoners’ marriage rights in Part I and interracial
couples’ marriage rights in Part II. The Essay concludes that the framework
endorsed by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito is an impermissible, stark
departure from precedent that would introduce an element of subordination
into the substantive due process doctrine.
I. THE NON-TRADITION OF PRISONER MARRIAGE RIGHTS
In Turner v. Safley, the Court rejected a longstanding, near nationally
uniform, history of denying prisoners the right to marry.25 In Turner, Missouri
prisoners successfully challenged a regulation that prohibited inmates from
marrying other inmates or civilians unless the prison superintendent
determined that compelling reasons justified the marriage.26 Notably, less than
ten years prior to Turner, only two states—California and Pennsylvania—had
formal written policies recognizing an inmate’s decision to marry as a right.27
And unlike California, which codified this right,28 Pennsylvania’s recognition
was an administrative directive that provided a mechanism to substantially
burden the right by empowering prison wardens to deny or delay marriage
requests.29 In 1977, only five states allowed inmates to marry without a prison
official’s approval.30 Writing in 1985, Virginia Hardwick described the
dominant practice among the states for regulating prisoners’ requests to marry,
which typically resembled the regulation challenged in Turner:
Under most state prison regulations, broad discretion to permit or
deny prisoner marriage is vested in prison administrators. The
procedure in Virginia presents a typical example. The Virginia
regulations allow the director to examine “each case on its individual
25

482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
Id. at 82 (“The challenged marriage regulation, which was promulgated while this litigation was
pending, permits an inmate to marry only with the permission of the superintendent of the prison, and provides
that such approval should be given only when there are compelling reasons to do so.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
27 Jackson M. Bruce et al., Comment, Prison Inmate Marriages: A Survey and a Proposal, 12 U. RICH.
L. REV. 443, 451 & n.60 (1978). Tennessee had an informal, unwritten policy that was said to recognize an
inmate’s decision to marry as a right. Id.
28 Id. at 466.
29 Id. at 452 n.75.
30 Id. at 451.
26
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merits taking into account the parties, their relationship prior to
incarceration, their financial assets, the public interest, and all other
31
pertinent considerations. The decision of the director [is] final . . . .

In the years preceding Turner, courts regularly upheld the types of
regulations that Turner held as an unconstitutional infringement of prisoners’
fundamental freedom to marry.32 Indeed, it was not until the 1980s that courts
gave a hard look at what had traditionally been judicially rubber-stamped carve
outs to the fundamental right to marry for prisoners.33 Yet, this history was not
a part of the Turner Court’s analysis. The Court did not ask whether the
practice of inmate marital rites was embedded in the nation’s fabric as
evidenced by tradition and history. Rather, the Court properly framed the
fundamental right simply as “the decision to marry.”34
Like Windsor, Turner did not employ a strict scrutiny analysis. The Court
sidestepped applying strict scrutiny in holding the marriage regulation was not
reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective.35 But, the Supreme
Court’s opinion never articulated that inmates’ right to marry required a
separate inquiry as to whether the prisoners sought a fundamental right
distinct from the fundamental freedom to marry already articulated in
precedent. The Court correctly used the similarities and differences, or lack
thereof, between civilians’ marriages and those marriages to which an inmate
was a party to weigh the validity of the rationale proffered by the government
for restricting the fundamental freedom to marry, not the nature of the right
asserted.
31 Virginia L. Hardwick, Note, Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitutional Restrictions on Prison
Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 275, 277 (1985) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
32 See, e.g., Wool v. Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928, 933 (D. Vt. 1981) (granting defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on prisoner’s cause of action seeking the right to marry); Holland v. Hutto, 450 F. Supp.
194, 197 (W.D. Va. 1978), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 601 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Goalen, 512 P.2d
1028, 1030–31 (Utah 1973) (“[T]he refusal of the warden to permit the marriage . . . does not violate
petitioner’s constitutional rights or those of [petitioner’s] convicted friend.”); Dep’t of Corr. v. Roseman, 390
So. 2d 394, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (“We hold that prison inmates have no fundamental right to
marry . . . .”); Koerner v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 394 A.2d 1262, 1264 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (rejecting
challenge to prison regulation allowing only prisoners in minimum custody and eligible for a furlough to
marry).
33 See, e.g., Bradbury v. Wainwright, 718 F.2d 1538, 1546 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing and remanding
summary judgment dismissing inmate’s freedom to marry claim); Lockert v. Faulkner, 574 F. Supp. 606, 609
(N.D. Ind. 1983) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on prisoner’s freedom to marry claim);
Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105, 110 (D. Nev. 1980) (rejecting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in
inmate marriage suit because there was “substantial controversy” as to whether the plaintiffs’ civil rights had
been infringed by the defendants).
34 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
35 Id. at 97–98.
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Under the analysis proposed by Justices Scalia and Alito in Windsor, the
Turner decision’s substantive due process rationale—which Justice Scalia
sanctioned as a member of the Turner majority—is unsupportable for want of a
national tradition and history of embracing inmate marriage.
II. THE HOSTILE TRADITION OF ANTI-MISCEGENATION
Loving v. Virginia also highlights the problematic posture of Justices Scalia
and Alito’s framework. Loving held that state anti-miscegenation laws violated
both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.36 Yet, interracial marriage was long disfavored by society and
prohibited by law since the nation’s founding. During the early seventeenth
century, for example, Virginia enforced unwritten miscegenation prohibitions
by public whippings and church penance.37 By 1691, Virginia enacted its first
statutory ban of miscegenation marriages.38 Virginia’s early proscription
against mixed race marriages was not alone. Indeed, Delaware, Massachusetts,
North Carolina, and Virginia all enacted anti-miscegenation laws prior to
1725—a trend that continued well into the antebellum era.39
Outlawing interracial marriages was commonplace well into the twentieth
century.40 Until the California Supreme Court did so in 1948,41 no court had
held that anti-miscegenation statutes violated equal protection principles.42
Three years after that ruling and sixteen years before Loving, twenty-nine
states prohibited interracial marriages including six states that banned
interracial marriage by state constitutional amendment.43 However, in the
fifteen years prior to Loving, fourteen states repealed their statutory bans.44
36

388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute in Historical
Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1966).
38 Id. at 1191–92.
39 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 38–39 (Cal. 1948).
40 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5.
41 Perez, 198 P.2d at 29.
42 Id. at 35 (Shenk, J., dissenting) (“[Interracial marriage bans] have never been declared unconstitutional
by any court in the land although frequently they have been under attack.”); see also Alfred Avins, AntiMiscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224, 1224 (1966)
(“[Interracial marriage prohibitions] have been upheld as constitutional by every appellate court which has
considered the point, with the single exception of the Supreme Court of California, which split four-to-three on
the question.” (footnote omitted)).
43 Perez, 198 P.2d at 38 (Shenk, J., dissenting). These state-level constitutional bans on interracial
marriages underscore the extent to which mixed race marriages were opposed in the South. So great was the
hostility to interracial couples’ marriage rights that states enshrined this rabid discrimination within their
fundamental documents—many of which were not repealed until well after Loving. See ALA. CONST. art. IV,
37
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While the pre-Loving liberalization of state laws is noteworthy, the shift
cannot be attributed to the manifestation of a “rooted” national “conscience”45
that interracial marriages were a fundamental right. In 1958, less than ten years
before Loving, Gallup recorded that only four percent of Americans approved
of interracial marriages.46 A year after Loving in 1968, the percentage of
Americans supporting interracial marriage rose significantly, but still
constituted a small minority at twenty percent.47
The idea of interracial marriage had a long presence in the American
marketplace of ideas, but was emphatically and aggressively rejected
throughout the nation’s history. Unlike the non-tradition of inmate marriage
rights, which was widely blocked by administrative fiat, pervasive racism was
entrenched in the heart of American law and society. There was not simply a
lack of a national tradition and history accepting interracial marriage, but a
strong tradition of its hostile rejection as manifested in the codification of
interracial marriage prohibitions in state constitutions and statutes.
Had the Loving Court asked whether mixed race marriage was a
fundamental right, deeply rooted in American history and tradition as Justice
Alito’s reasoning would argue, the Court could not have employed the
substantive due process rationale it did in Loving. Of course, the Supreme
Court in Loving could have only applied strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause, avoiding the fundamental rights question altogether and
without affecting the ultimate outcome.48 But, the fact remains that the
formulation of the due process right to marry as articulated by the dissenting
justices in Windsor would be unintelligible to the Loving Court.
CONCLUSION
The analysis developed in Loving and Turner cannot square with the
posture advocated in either Justice Scalia or Justice Alito’s forceful dissenting
opinion. Indeed, the dissenting justices’ posture of analysis for a same-sex

§ 102 (repealed 2000); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XVI, § 24; MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263 (repealed 1987);
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XIV, § 8 (1875); S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 33 (repealed 1999); TENN. CONST. art. XI,
§ 14 (repealed 1978).
44 Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5.
45 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
46 Joseph Carroll, Most Americans Approve of Interracial Marriages, GALLUP (Aug. 16, 2007),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/28417/most-americans-approve-interracial-marriages.aspx.
47 Id.
48 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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couple’s freedom to marry claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause is inconsistent with precedent. However, more than just an
erroneous application of substantive due process, this suspect departure from
the constitutional canon relegates same-sex couples to an inferior position
within the process and structure of constitutional analysis.
In demanding same-sex couples argue that same-sex marriage is a
fundamental right distinct from the preexisting recognized fundamental
freedom to marry, the Court would demand something of same-sex couples not
required in previous constitutional challenges to barriers blocking the
fundamental marriage right. Thus, if their views prevailed, the Windsor
dissenters would subordinate same-sex couples into an inferior, segregated tier
within the two-tiered fundamental marriage right analysis. Rendering
constitutional decisions with tools of interpretation that disparately burden a
class of persons united by an immutable characteristic conflicts with the
American civil rights tradition and must be zealously rejected.
Given Loving and its progeny’s special place in the constitutional canon,
courts cannot cavalierly apply a substantive due process analysis that deviates
from the Loving formulation of the fundamental marriage right, as Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito would allow. The Windsor dissenters’ theory is
unmoored from the Court’s own rich constitutional tradition and must be
challenged head-on by future litigants and courts.

